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'A Klee painting named 'Angelus Novus' shows an
angel looking as though he is about to move away
from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes
are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread.
This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face
is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain
of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of
his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead,
and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm
is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings
with such violence that the angel can no longer close
them. This storm irresistably propels him into the
future to which his back is turned, while the pile of
debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what
we call progress.' Walter Benjamin, Illuminations,
Schocken Paperbacks, New York, 1969.
'A world in which politics is replaced by arsenals and
economy by finance is simply a world in danger.' Raul
Alfonsin, President of Argentina, quoted in SIPRI,
1985: 445.
Like the angel of history we all wish we could stretch
back to repair the past. Still more, we would like to
turn our heads forward to avert the catastrophes of the
future. Five years ago, when introducing the Report of
the Independent Commission on International
Development Issues, North-South: a Programme for
Survival, Willy Brandt had this to say to the
international community:
We see a world in which poverty and hunger still
prevail in many huge regions; in which resources
are squandered without consideration of their
renewal; and where a destructive capacity has been
accumulated to blow up our planet several times
over. [Hence this]. . . globalisation of dangers and
challenges - war, chaos, self-destruction - calls
for a domestic policy which goes much beyond
parochial or even national items. Yet this is
happening at a snail's pace. A rather defensive
pragmatism still prevails, when what we need are
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new perspectives and bold leadership . . . The
'international community' is still too cut off from
the experience of ordinary people and vice versa.
In spite of these warnings and many others like it, the
snail's pace has become disorderly retreat. At the start
of the 1980s the world economy slid into a new phase
of recession, from which recovery is still uncertain.
Furthermore, this deterioration and its effects on the
developing countries could probably have been
avoided, being 'explained in part by past policy
choices as well as underlying economic and social
conditions. In an interdependent world economy,
growth in the developing countries is significantly
affected by what happens in industrial countries'
[World Bank 1984: 12].
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Recession has coincided with a marked acceleration in
the global arms race. After a period of decline (both in
constant price values and relative to GNP) the military
spending of the major Western powers, especially the
United States, has increased sharply (Table 1). Trends
in the socialist bloc are less easy to discern because of'
the absence of reliable official figures, though most
sources are in agreement that steady increases have
occurred in the Soviet Union [SIPRI 1985: 2511
contrasting with the more cyclical behaviour of the
United States. The deployment in Europe of Soviet
SS2O and American Cruise and Pershing missiles has
gone ahead. Having broken down altogether at the
end of 1983, negotiations concerning nuclear weapons
have (since January 1985) resumed; though for the
present they remain little more than 'talks about
talks', being stalled over the United States' Strategic
Defence Initiative for defence against ballistic missiles
('Star Wars'). Meanwhile there has been no sign of a
resumption of the talks between the two superpowers
concerning the limitation of conventional arms
transfers to developing countries or of those about
military restraints in the Indian Ocean, broken off in
the late 1970s.
Instead, the major military powers (France and the
UK as well as the superpowers) have built up their
intervention forces, increased global naval deploy-
ments and negotiated new military facilities in the
Third World, incorporating new areas within the
strategic terrain of the new Cold War. The possibility
of horizontal escalation between war theatres in
Europe and the Third World is often discussed by
strategic analysts. The 1978 fictional simulation of the
Third World War by General Sir John Hackett and a
team of military experts [Hackett 19781 describes how
a nuclear confrontation between the powers in Europe
in 1985 is precipitated by conflicts in the Middle East
and Southern Africa, along with unrest in Poland and
a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia - a reconstruction
that was supplemented in 1982 to cover events in
Central Atherica and the Far East [Hackett 1983].
Such scenarios are by no means confined to works of
fiction. They are widely used by Northern governments
and military planners to argue for closer involvement
in Third World security questions. Conversely it is
often argued that it is precisely the transfer of East-
West tensions to the South that establishes a deadly
connection between Third World conflict and global
insecurity [see for example, Nincic 1985 and Tamas
Szentes' article in this issue of the IDS Bulletin].
These developments have reinforced a widening
disparity between global power relations and trends in
the international economy. The long run decline of the
US economy relative to Europe, Japan and the NICs
[analysed in more detail in two recent issues of the IDS
Bulletin: IDS l985a and b], led to the breakdown of the
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Bretton Woods system and ushered in a multipolar
and altogether more anarchic international economic
regime. In contrast, however, control over strategic
relationships remains where it has been since the late
1940s - firmly in the hands of the superpowers.
Indeed this control has been further consolidated by
the Cold War. It is epitomised in the current Geneva
'umbrella' negotiations between the USA and the
Soviet Union. One interpretation of the Strategic
Defence Initiative is that it is as much aimed at
reasserting the US's global power as at changing the
strategic relationship with the Soviet Union.
This disparity between a bipolar military order and a
multipolar economic order has reinforced the
superpowers' determination to maintain their strategic
duopoly. In both the USA and the Soviet Union an
interdependence has been established between the
military and the non-military sectors of the economy
through the respective mechanisms of a market and of
a centrally-planned economy. In both, the military
and military-related industries are almost the only
lines of production in which they have managed to
maintain a clear competitive edge. The temptation to
sell arms and to use force directly in the Third World is
arguably all the stronger.
In turn the transfer of East-West military rivalries to
the Third World has affected North-South economic
relationships. One place where this is visible is in the
aid programmes of the major world powers. The
previous trend from bilateral to multilateral assistance
has been decisively reversed. The allocation of aid has
been increasingly harnessed to economic and military
purposes. A recent review of US assistance carried out
for the Secretary of State (the first major overall
review of US aid policy since 1970) concluded that
economic and military assistance must be closely
integrated.
Economic growth and rising standards of living are
vital to internal stability and external defense.
Threats to stability impede economic development
and prosperity. Thus . . . the future effectiveness of
the mutual assistance program rests on the concept
that security and growth are mutually reinforcing
and that both are fundamental to the advancement
of US interests [Commission on Security and
Economic Assistance 1983: 2-3].
As for the developing countries themselves, their
military spending (see Table 2) has increased more or
less continuously over the post-independence era,
faster on the whole than that of the industrial North,
although the increases tailed off in the early 1980s,
when the full impact of the second and more severe
phase of the recession made itself felt. The opportunity
costs of military spending in terms of development and
Table 2
World Military Expenditure, 1975-84'
At 1980 prices and exchange rates.
Source: SIPRI [1985: 270]
even more of social welfare expenditures are high. Yet
the fact is that many governments in the South place
more emphasis upon national defence than upon
development, arguing indeed that the latter is
meaningless without the former.
Most developing countries are unable to meet their
needs for military equipment from local production,
thus being forced into the international arms market
where they pay both dearly and frequently for
successive generations of weapons systems. The Third
World's imports of major weapons approximately
doubled in constant price values during the 1960s and
quadrupled in the 1970s, before levelling off and then
declining in the early 1980s (Table 3). At the same
time, most suppliers have reduced their military grants
and insist on payment on commercial terms. Thus in
the great majority of cases arms imports have had to
be paid for in scarce foreign exchange. The need to
earn the latter has far-reaching implications for the
structure and management of domestic economies: for
example increasing their vulnerability to unstable or
declining terms of trade, encouraging short-sighted
policies towards non-renewable resources and adding
to their international debt burdens. According to the
Stockholm Peace Research Institute's estimates,
during the period 1972-82 foreign borrowing by non-
oil developing countries could have been approxi-
mately 20 per cent less each year and their
accumulated debts at the end of the period some 15 per
cent smaller, had they made no foreign purchases of
arms (Table 4).
Table 3
Trends in Export of Major Weapons to Third World,
1965-84
US$ million'
At constant (1975) prices.
Source: SIPRI [1985: 370-371]
Whilst the industrial North faces the prospect of a
potential nuclear holocaust, much of the developing
South is already engulfed in violence: both the direct
violence of armed conflict, and the structural violence
of repression and underdevelopment. Some of the
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1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Share of
World
Total
%
Industrial market economies 257,534 252,529 260,073 265,584 270,652 280,052 290,278 307,827 324,230 348,697 53.7
Non-market economies [171,972] [175,263] [176,551] [183,312] [197,798] [189,842] [185,448] [189,7571 [191,671] [196,133] 30.2
Major oil-exporting countries 33,352 37,450 [36,185] 38,107 38,941 41.712 [45,143] [48,598] [44,874] [44,988] 6.9
Rest of the world 43,452 47,509 49,215 49,205 51,357 51,168 54,238 [61,8621 [60,018] [57,419] 8.8
With 1982 per capita GNP:
<US$440 6,651 7,241 6,997 7,715 8,306 8,284 8,944 9,712 10,045 9,985 1.5
US$440-1,679 8,979 9,323 10,193 8,547 8,541 8,101 8,493 9,385 9,415 8,635 1.3
>US$1.680 27,822 30,945 32,025 32,943 34,510 34,783 36,801 42,765 40,558 38,799 6.0
World total 507,480 514,030 523,400 537,730 560,330 564,440 576,860 609,900 622,800 649,070 100.0
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wars fought in the South have been as destructive as
any fought on this planet. Their casualties (since
World War II) number in the tens of millions, not to
mention those who have been wounded, fled the war
zones or become victims of hunger and disease. Two
things have greatly increased the devastation. First,
the social character of many conflicts, the fact that
they are not merely conventional wars between states
but are rooted in much broader social upheavals - as
in Central America, Southern Africa, the Lebanon or
Afghanistan. And secondly, the fact that advances in
military technology have introduced ever more
powerful ways of killing, maiming and destroying.
Chemical weapons and other ways of modifying the
natural environment have already been used in
conflicts in the Third World - by the US, for example,
in Vietnam, by Iraq against Iran and perhaps by the
USSR in Afghanistan. At the same time the
conventional munitions developed by the arms
manufacturers - cluster and fragmentation bombs,
fuel-air explosives etc - and increasingly utilised in
the Third World, have become so destructive that they
are calling in question the established boundaries
between nuclear and conventional warfare.
Thus it is no longer possible (if it ever was) to make
sharp moral and empirical distinctions between the
risk of nuclear mass destruction in the North and the
appalling realities of warfare and underdevelopment
in the developing South. Any inventory one might
make of those - including children - who are most at
risk from poverty, disease and natural disaster would
overlap with those most at risk from military violence.
The target-groups of poverty-focused development
assistance have too frequently also been the targets of
weapons. There are direct and indirect causal
relationships between armed conflict, economic
deterioration and even natural disasters (like the
droughts in the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa).
It is difficult to generalise about such interconnections,
since they vary so much from situation to situation.
Nevertheless, they deserve more serious scrutiny by
development researchers and practitioners than they
usually receive.
Glimmers of hope can be extracted from the
resumption of arms talks and the impending Reagan-
Gorbachev Summit. In the longer run the relative
economic decline of the superpowers and the
disagreement developing between the USA and
Western Europe over issues such as the Strategic
Defence Initiative, economic relations with Eastern
Europe, industrial protection and intervention in the
Third World could open up opportunities for change
as well as give rise to fresh dangers.
As for the developing countries themselves, their
military expenditures have never (in spite of rapid
growth) constituted more than a small fraction of the
global total (see Table 2). Some comfort can be
extracted from the fact that they have now ceased to
rise. In any case, there has always been much diversity,
with some countries (many of them oil exporters)
devoting large shares of government revenue and
GNP to military purposes and others relatively little.
The bulk of arms purchases have been heavily
concentrated among a relatively small number of
Third World recipients, many of them in the Middle
East (Table 3). The determinants of arms transfers are
too complex to be explained purely in terms of East-
West relations or the 'pushing' of arms by the
suppliers (even though both are crucial).
Table 5
African imports of major weapons, 1970-83: by
economic and geographical groups
At constant (1975) prices.
2 Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.
The Horn includes Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan.
Southern Africa includes South Africa, Angola, Botswana,
Mozambique, Tanzania. Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Algeria. Congo, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria.
Source: SIPRI [1985: 3011
An illustration of this complexity is provided in
Table 5 which demonstrates how at different times
since 1970 the major factors influencing the transfer of
arms to Africa have varied, including the recycling of
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oil revenues by African members of OPEC; the
conflicts in the Horn and Southern Africa; and the
recent conclusion by the United States of agreements
with strategically placed countries in North Africa and
the Horn under which arms have been supplied in
exchange for military facilities for the rapid
deployment force (US Central Command). Another
factor which the Table does not, however, bring out is
the fact that the Soviet Union was the continent's
major supplier for much of the 1970s [see Luckham
1985a].
The flow of arms to the Third World contracted
sharply in the first part of the 1980s and there is little
evidence that it is likely to resume its previous rapid
growth. It is sometimes argued that this is because the
arms market is now saturated after a period in which
several developing countries simultaneously re-
plenished their armouries with new generations of
sophisticated weapons. More important, however, is
the impact of recession and international debt. Many
oil exporters have exhausted the surplus funds they
used to buy arms; and some are no longer even
considered credit-worthy borrowers. Other developing
countries (excepting some NICs) are even less able to
find the hard currency for weapons purchases. This is
only partly offset by thé fact that the superpowers are
tending more frequently than in the recent past to offer
arms on concessional terms. But there is little evidence
that such reductions have facilitated either the
cessation of armed conflict or a reduction in military
participation in government - with the possible
exception of the current process of demilitarisation in
Latin America [see Mario Carranza's article in this
Bulletin].
Against this sombre background the contributors to
this issue of the IDS Bulletin were asked to reassess the
Reports of the Brandt' and Palme Commissions
(Reports of the Independent Commission on
Internatioñal Development Issues, 1980 and 1983;
Report of the Independent Commission on Dis-
armament and Security Issues, 1982) and of the United
Nations Study on the Relationship between Disarmament
and Development (the Thorsson Report: United
Nations 1981). All four studies were made during a
period of transition in the global economy and the
Cold War (1979-83). Despite differences of emphasis
they all advocate an integrated global approach to
world economic and military problems, the restruc-
turing of North-South economic relationships,
strengthening of detente and reductions in the
allocation of resources for military purposes. They
have sometimes been criticised for not taking their
analysis far enough or for lack of political realism [see
for example IDS 1981, Luckham 1985b and Holm
below). But it cannot be disputed that the reports
represented a crucial series of initiatives by influential
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groups operating inside the international policy-
making community, at a critical juncture in history.
Why, then, have they had so little impact on policy and
still less on the march of events? Is it because of
inconsistencies in the arguments of the reports
themselves? Did they give enough attention to the
political changes that might be required - such as
dismantling the system of blocs, reorganising the UN
or establishing a political constituency for dis-
armament in the Third World as well as in Europe and
North America? Why has international discussion
tended to isolate the economic from the strategic/
political dimensions of the present global crisis? Why
do policy-makers in the North seem to show so little
interest in disarmament and development? Is there a
legitimate basis for Third World suspicion of
Northern proposals to limit arms transfers and
military spending in the South? Or is the lack of
progress merely one consequence among many of the
overall deterioration in the international situation?
Our contributors were also asked to address
themselves to how disarmament and development
could be put back on the international agenda. Should
each issue be dealt with separately on its own merits,
or is a coordinated approach required? What can be
learnt from the successes and failures of earlier
proposals? What role can Third World countries play?
How might their demands be linked to European
proposals for dealignment from the blocs? Do the new
negotiations between the superpowers create the space
for other initiatives to reduce international tension?
How might the forthcoming UN Special Conference
on Disarmament and Development be used to launch
a new series of initiatives?
Willy Brandt and Inga Thorsson argue strongly that
most of the findings of their respective reports remain
valid today. Failing to implement them - and instead
applying 'considerable skills . . . to patch up holes 'as
Brandt put it - is the fault of the superpowers. A
similar analysis is made by Shridath Ramphal, a
member of both the Brandt and the Palme
Commissions, who adds that the winds of history were
already turning against detente and the construction
of a New International Economic Order when the
reports were put before the public. All three, however,
believe that the superpowers can still be iniluenced by
political pressures and by appeals to their enlightened
self interest. They support a multilateral approach,
calling for a strengthening of the decision-making and
peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations. And
they argue that both disarmament and development
remain very much on the UN agenda, pointing out
that the debate over their relationship will continue
- though perhaps in a lower key - at the 1986 UN
Special Conference.
Next we come to two outside assessments. The first, by
Hans-Henrik Holm is a useful summary of the reports
and a biting critique. The reports are faulted on two
major grounds. First, for their tendency to assume
that the world's major problems could be solved by
transfers of resources from rich countries to poor and
from military to non-military uses, without adequate
empirical demonstration of the intervening links.
Second, for their lack of political realism: their failure
to translate multilateral measures based on long term
common interests into policies for change that
national governments, especially those of the major
military powers, could implement. In this he
reinforces some of the criticisms made of the Brandt
Report in a previous issue of the Bulletin, 'Britain on
Brandt' [IDS 1981, especially the article by Vaitsos]:
that the practical procedures for implementing its
proposals were not well enough specified in technical
terms, were at variance with established global power
relations and assumed a mutuality of interest between
North and South which the mere fact of their
interdependence did not necessarily create.
Some readers might think these criticisms rather
harsh. The difficulties of moving from analysis to
policy and from policy to practice are notorious.
Unlike the angel of history, the angel of policy sets his
face so resolutely forward that he does not see the
storms catching him from behind. The angel of politics
(if there is one) is so busy trimming his wings to the
winds that he cares not where they take him until he
falls.
There is, however, no lack of concrete proposals in the
reports which, after all, were the work of men and
women who possess between them vast collective
experience in the making of policy. In his article Willy
Brandt suggests that Europe should play a more active
role in bringing the superpowers to the negotiating
table and in reactivating proposals for a 'global
discussion' of international economic issues. Shridath
Ramphal argues that the non-nuclear countries can
ensure that alternative voices are heard on disarmament
through a variety of international channels, including
the Commonwealth. Inga Thorsson emphasises the
importance of domestic and international political
processes, since governments tend not to take action
unless obliged to by their citizens. She also extracts
some encouragement from the economic difficulties
facing the industrial North: that this could force a
reassessment of the costs of the arms race by
governments in both major military blocs.
But, these are piecemeal suggestions. They do not
directly address the deep structures of the arms race;
nor (except Thorsson) do they give enough attention
to political processes through which it could be
reversed. A good starting point for understanding the
latter is provided by Chris Smith and Mac Graham,
who argue that the disarmament and development
debate is itself the outcome of a distinct political
process played out within the inherent limitations of
the UN system. It first emerged in the 1960s as a direct
reaction to the manner in which the superpowers
pushed disarmament to the sidelines in favour of arms
control based on bilateral negotiations (or in a few
instances talks among a limited circle of nuclear-
armed states). It acquíred its own political con-
stituencies among the neutral countries in Europe and
the non-aligned countries in the Third World. It
gathered momentum during the period of detente,
climaxing at the 1978 and 1982 UN Special Sessions on
Disarmament. But like detente it was undermined by
the renewal of the arms race.
The arms race in turn has been driven by the sectoral
momentum of the military product cycle combined
with shifts in international power politics. One might
almost talk of a political trade cycle, clearly visible in
the movements of US military spending depicted in
Table 1. New generations of weapons systems have
been developed and brought into service. This has
encouraged the major military powers to extend the
frontiers of the Cold War into space and into the Third
World. It has also brought even bilateral talks to a
virtual halt.
Such arguments are taken still further in a sweeping
critique by Ferenc Miszlivetz of the way disarmament
has been subverted by the bipolar logic of the arms
race. There has developed a symmetry between civil
society and the military sector, cemented by a
promiscuous network of military interests and
alliances and legitimised by the concept of security: a
characterisation he regards as being equally (but
differently) valid for the socialist countries of the East
as for the capitalist countries of the West. It is in this
context that he suggests that military technology may
be the most crucial legacy of the North to the South,
almost inevitably shaping the process of development.
The way East-West conflicts have been extended to the
South, contributing to the latter's militarisation, is
also takenup by Tamas Szentes. His perspective is
perhaps less Manichean, and he argues that the
distinctions between North and South, East and West
are simplifications that sometimes get in the way of
our understanding of the underlying relationships.
What is particularly striking is his argument that the
Cold War has encouraged the transfer of inappropriate
socialist as well as capitalist development models: the
former failing, indeed, to reflect crucial changes in
economic management that have taken place in
Eastern Europe since the earlier Cold War period.
The danger, however, with arguments that the Cold
War and inequalities between North and South are so
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deeply entrenched in the international system that
they will not respond to policy reforms such as those
proposed in the Brandt, Palme and Thorsson reports,
is that they can easily induce apathy: roll on the
holocaust! Or they can lead, full circle, to a cynical
conservatism: power politics is all that counts and the
devil take the hindmost ! Any strategy for change must
be able to identify the fault-lines as well as the
structures, the virtuous as well as the vicious circles.
This in turn, requires a better understanding of
empirical relationships. Does military spending in fact
entrench underdevelopment? How easily can resources
be transferred from military to non-military uses? To
what extent and through what mechanisms is
militarisation in the South linked to the arms race in
the North? Will the resources released by cuts in
military spending be used for productive purposes
rather than conspicuous consumption? Is there an
adequate political case for linking disarmament to
development; or is connecting them likely to obstruct
progress on both?
A major obstacle to establishing the empirical
connections is the absence of reliable data on the
military sector. This situation is examined by Nicole
Ball, who proposes a number of ways in which it could
be remedied, including the use of national military
budgets to supplement the information available in
the standard international statistical sources. Both in
the industrial and the developing countries govern-
ments tend to conceal their security expenditures from
public scrutiny. The data are seldom disaggregated in
a manner that enables researchers to analyse the most
crucial variables, for example the foreign exchange
component of military spending. As Dudley Seers
once pointed out, this is a difficulty with which
development researchers are already familiar. Many
of the standard macroeconomic indicators - national
accounts, government budgets, balance of payments
- presuppose a Keynesian model of advanced
industrial economies and are of less use in
understanding the dynamics of developing economies
[Seers 1983].
Deger and Smith also argue for more careful analysis
of the variety of channels through which military
spending can affect the development process. Their
own econometric studies (some of which are cited in
the UN report) suggest that defence spending reduces
growth through its adverse effects on saving,
investment and foreign exchange, as well as on human
capital and absorbtive capacity. These more than
compensate for the positive effects in terms of the
mobilisation of resources and possible technological
spin-offs.
A warning note is, however, sounded by David Evans
who used more recent evidence based on the World
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Bank's 1983 World Development Report, to demon-
strate that the positive effects of military spending may
(in the 1970s) have outweighed their diversion of
surpluses from productive investment. The title of his
article, 'Back to Benoit?', referring to the original
studies by Emile Benoit which had uncovered positive
relationships between military spending and growth,
is perhaps misleading. For the real message is that
more specific analysis is required, with regard to time-
periods, regions and above all the particular models of
development being implemented and their political
conditions. Strong government and high military
spending (though the two do not necessarily go
together) could well facilitate certain types of
externally-oriented capitalist development [Luckham
1977]. The same could well be true of some models of
socialist development, at least if the frequency of left-
wing military regimes ('garrison socialism') is
anything to go by.
This line of argument is reinforced by Eboe Hutchful
in regard to Africa, and by John Ohiorhenuan in his
case study of Nigeria. They both suggest that
structural adjustment programmes of the type
proposed by the Berg Report in Africa (discussed in
IDS 1983) frequently impose heavy social costs and
result in political instability. Authoritarian govern-
ment is a necessary condition for the particular type of
'crisis management' undertaken under the supervision
of the IMF and World Bank. Ohiorhenuan argues that
this helps explain the heavily repressive policies of the
recently deposed Nigerian military government;
although even the latter never concluded a formal
agreement with the IMF, because it believed the
political costs of devaluation to be too high.
So can it still be argued that disarmament and the
reallocation of resources from military purposes are in
Third World interests? The response to this question
falls into two parts, depending on whether one is
referring to disarmament in the industrial North or in
the Third World. The latter, as Eboe Hutchful shows,
is problematic to say the least. African countries are
still on the whole lightly armed by global standards, in
spite of two decades of rapid growth in their military
spending and arms purchases. Their governments
have legitimate security concerns, including aggression
from South Africa and repeated military intervention
by external powers. Even if there were to be major
resource transfers from the industrial North these
would not by themselves overcome underdevelop-
ment. Development and the removal of the basic
injustices which cause conflict are the first priorities on
the African agenda; and disarmament is only relevant
to the extent that it can be demonstrated - and not
simply assumed - that it advances them.
Mario Carranza is less doubtful of the relevance of
demilitarisation to Latin America. A number of South
American countries have recently transferred power
from military to civilian hands, as well as cut their
military spending. The so-called 'Brazilian miracle' no
longer looks like such a good advertisement for
military rule as it did some years ago; still less does the
catastrophic economic situation presided over by the
Chilean and the former Argentinian juntas. In Central
America, armed conflict and US intervention are
unequivocally the main causes both of military
expenditure increases and economic deterioration.
There is little here to support the argument that there
is any fixed relationship between strong government
and development, even along market-oriented World
Bank/IMF lines [see Diaz Alejandro 1983, who
introduces a similar note of scepticism].
One reason for divergence between Carranza and
Hutchful may be the latter's somewhat narrow
definition of disarmament in terms of nuclear arms
control in the North and cuts in military budgets in the
South: a combination which has admittedly tended to
result in social transformation in the South becoming
mortgaged to the preservation of the nuclear balance
between East and West. A broader conceptualisation
of disarmament in terms of transformations in the
social and economic relationships which underpin
both the arms race and the international division of
labour would not be open to the same objections
- although it might become correspondingly more
difficult to specify empirically.
Nevertheless, Hutchful believes a good case can be
made for a 'nuclear free zone' Africa. He doubts,
however, whether African countries could negotiate
- still less enforce - such a zone in the present
situation of confrontation between the superpowers.
Carranza reviews Latin America's rather more
extensive experience of regional arms limitation,
including the 1967 Treaty of Tlateloco declaring Latin
America a nuclear-weapons-free zone, and the 1974
Ayacucho Declaration on regional conflict-resolution
and arms limitation. The former, however, has been
undermined by the proliferation of 'civilian' nuclear
technology; and the latter has had relatively little
effect on regional arms races. Nevertheless such
agreements have symbolic importance, illustrated by
the conclusion of a five country agreement to declare
the Pacific a nuclear-free zone, in August 1985 (shortly
after the sabotage of the Rainbow Warrior).
Regional security and arms limitation agreements
such as these were a major recommendation of the
Palme Report. But Third World countries are bound
to have reservations about limitating their own
armament whilst the superpowers still regard
themselves as entitled to use force in the Third World
and preserve their monopoly over negotiations
concerning the central strategic balance. Similarly the
inability of the major world powers to restrain nuclear
competition among themselves has emerged as one of
the major obstacles to agreement about nuclear non-
proliferation, as at the 1985 NPT Review Conference.
So can governments in the North be persuaded it is in
their interest too, to curb military spending and
disengage from the arms race? As Inga Thorsson
points out, if the linkages between military spending
and economic stagnation can be empirically demon-
strated, this strengthens the political case for
disarmament. It also suggests the case for limiting
arms sales, to the extent that the latter are necessary
for the maintenance of prevailing specialisations in
military production. Deger and Smith's analysis of
military spending in the developing countries follows
up earlier studies by Smith (1977) which suggest that in
the advanced capitalist countries of the OECD
military expenditure in the post World War II period
has been negatively related to investment and, through
investment, to growth. The economies with the highest
military spending relative to national product (the
USA, the UK and France) have invested less and have
grown slower than those with historically lower
military burdens (notably West Germany and Japan).
Raphael Kaplinsky examines the longer term factors
that account for this uneven pattern of industrial
accumulation, suggesting that military spending
(contrary to what is popularly assumed) has had a net
negative effect on technological progress, both in the
USA and in the UK.
But do these considerations still hold good in a period
of recession, when military cuts could bring loss of
jobs and adverse multiplier effects? The large military
increases of the early 1980s, it is sometimes
maintained, have helped restore growth in the US
economy. Whether the recovery is sustainable is still
not clear. Perhaps alternative strategies for economic
recovery, based on civilian investment would have
lower opportunity costs and create more employment.
Yet as in the 1930s [see Kalecki 1943] military
spending has been a politically more attractive option
during a period of gathering domestic and inter-
national tension; all the more so when full
employment has ceased to be the touchstone of
economic policy.
Nevertheless, if alternative options are to be put
forward, realistic strategies for the conversion of
military resources to civilian uses are essential. As
regards the UK, Kaplinsky points out successful large
scale resource transfers have been achieved on at least
three occasions since World War II, both from and
(over the past six years) to the military sector. The
most systematic attempt to date to spell out a strategy
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for conversion in an advanced industrial economy is
lnga Thorsson's report to the Swedish government, In
Pursuit of Disarmament IGovernment of Sweden
1984], reviewed in this Bulletin by Sue Willett. The
special structural characteristics of the military
industries - their orientation toward product rather
than process innovation ('gold-plating'), cost
escalation, their cosy relationship with the defence
establishment - create technical problems which
Thorsson nevertheless argues are soluble. Less
amenable to technical solutions, as Willett points out,
are the political issues: to elaborate a programme of
military reductions for the UK could be construed as a
challenge to NATO. 1f conversion implies less reliance
on arms sales, cuts in naval and 'rapid deployment'
forces and reduced military commitments 'outside the
NATO area', it also requires changed relationships
with the Third World. In a world in which the costs of
economic recovery have all too frequently been passed
on to the Third World - through high interest rates,
aid cuts, the economic and political conditionalities
built into aid programmes and interventionist foreign
policies - this may present the greatest challenge of
all.
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